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BLOOD AND BREATH TESTS—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS BLOOD AND
BREATH TESTS INCIDENT TO DUI ARREST: IMPACT ON
DRUNK DRIVING IN NORTH DAKOTA
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016)
ABSTRACT
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court held
the Fourth Amendment does not allow states to conduct warrantless blood
tests incident to an arrest for drunk driving. Additionally, the Court limited
the consequences of implied consent statutes and determined such consent
only applies to conditions that are reasonable. Therefore, the Court
explained that motorists cannot be presumed to have consented to submit to
an unconstitutional warrantless blood test, and their refusal cannot be
criminalized. The Court analyzed the totality of the circumstances in two
basic categories to determine whether warrantless blood and breath tests are
constitutional incident to a lawful arrest: (1) the privacy of the individual
and (2) legitimate government concerns. Birchfield significantly impacts
North Dakota and its efforts in recent years to combat drunk driving
because the legislature is now tasked with exploring effective new strategies
that comport with the Fourth Amendment.
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I. FACTS
Each year, intoxicated motorists cause massive property destruction
and injuries, many of which are fatal.1 In an effort to combat this nationwide epidemic, each state prohibits drunk driving when a driver’s blood
alcohol concentration (“BAC”) exceeds a certain level.2 To measure this
BAC level, authorities must administer a test, usually using a driver’s
breath or blood.3 To ensure drivers suspected of drunk driving do not
simply refuse to take the test, hindering law enforcement’s ability to impose
penalties for breaking the law, all states have adopted implied consent
laws.4 These laws penalize drivers who refuse testing when authorities
have sufficient reason to believe they were driving under the influence.5
Some states imposed civil penalties, evidentiary consequences, or both
upon a driver’s refusal to comply with the testing procedures.6 Other states,

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 2167.
Id. at 2166.
Id.
Id. at 2169.
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including North Dakota, Minnesota, and eleven others, criminalized a
driver’s refusal to submit to BAC testing after being lawfully arrested for
drunk driving.7
Three petitioners, Danny Birchfield, William Robert Bernard, Jr., and
Steve Michael Beylund, challenged the constitutionality of such criminal
refusal statutes.8 All three petitioners were arrested for driving while
impaired and advised of their state’s implied consent statutes.9 In addition,
each petitioner was informed that failure to comply with BAC testing would
result in criminal penalties.10
The first petitioner, Birchfield, refused to submit to a blood test.11
Consequently, Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for violating the
North Dakota refusal statute.12 Although he entered a conditional guilty
plea, Birchfield argued that criminalizing refusal to submit to a warrantless
blood test was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.13 The state district
court rejected the argument, and the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed.14
Similarly, the second petitioner, Bernard, refused to take a breath test
and was charged with first degree test refusal, a violation of Minnesota
law.15 The Minnesota District Court determined warrantless breath tests
were not permitted under the Fourth Amendment, and dismissed the
charges accordingly.16 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the
decision, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.17
The final petitioner, Beylund, agreed to have his blood drawn after he
was informed that he would be charged with a crime upon refusal.18 Law

7. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2166; Brief for Petitioner at *3 n.1, Birchfield v. North Dakota,
136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (No. 14-1468), 2016 WL 447640. The eleven other states with similar
statutes include: (1) Alaska (Alaska Stat. §28.35.032); (2) Florida (Fla. Stat. §316.1932); (3)
Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 291e-68); (4) Indiana (Ind. Code. § 9-30-7-5); (5) Kansas (Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 8-1025); (6) Louisiana (La. Stat. Ann. § 14:98.7); (7) Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 606,197,60-6,211.02); (8) Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.1); (9) Tennessee (Tenn. Code
Ann. § 55-10-406); (10) Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1201(b), (c)); and (11) Virginia (Va.
Code Ann. § 18.2-268.3). The Supreme Court of Hawaii recently held Hawaii’s compelledconsent statute unconstitutional. State v. Won, 361 P.3d 1195, 1198-99 (Haw. 2015).
8. Id. at 2170-73.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2170.
12. Id.
13. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170-71.
14. Id. at 2171.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2171-72.
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enforcement officers conducted a chemical test, which identified his BAC
was over three times the legal limit.19 As a result, at the administrative
hearing, the Hearing Officer chose to suspend Beylund’s driver’s license for
two years.20 The state district court rejected Beylund’s argument that his
consent was coerced by the officer’s warning, and the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed.21
While the individual circumstances of the petitioners are different, each
petitioner’s case hinged on resolving a common issue.22 On appeal, the
common issue was the constitutionality of warrantless blood and breath
tests incident to a drunk driving arrest.23 If such warrantless tests are to be
deemed constitutional, the subsequent criminalization of refusals to comply
would be allowed.24 Alternatively, if warrantless tests are prohibited under
the Fourth Amendment, a state may not criminalize refusals to submit to
unconstitutional warrantless searches.25 Accordingly, the Birchfield Court
analyzed the constitutionality of warrantless blood and breath tests incident
to drunk driving arrest to determine if states are able to impose criminal
penalties for BAC test refusal.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Over the past century, the United States Supreme Court has delineated
the contours of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.26 The Fourth
Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.27
The Supreme Court has determined that a blood or breath test to
determine an individual’s BAC is a search governed by the Fourth

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Amendment and must adhere to the reasonableness requirement therein.28
Generally, a warrant must be secured to conduct searches, but this
requirement is subject to a number of exceptions.29 Relevant here are the
exigent circumstances and search incident to arrest exceptions.30
A. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION
The United States Supreme Court has established an exception to the
warrant requirement for exigent circumstances.31 This exception allows
authorities to conduct a warrantless search when circumstances surrounding
an emergency leave insufficient time to obtain a valid warrant and prompt
action is required.32 Prior to Birchfield, the Supreme Court contemplated
the application of this exception in two drunk driving cases, Schmerber v.
California and Missouri v. McNeely.33
In Schmerber, the Supreme Court determined an exigent circumstance
was presented when law enforcement officers sought to obtain the BAC of
a driver who was receiving treatment for car accident injuries.34 The Court
reasoned the circumstances constituted an emergency suitable for a
warrantless search because “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to
diminish shortly after drinking stops.”35 More recently, the McNeely Court
narrowed the application of the exigent circumstances exception in drunk
driving cases.36 The Court did not allow the ruling in Schmerber to extend
to all drunk driving cases.37 Accordingly, it mandated a case-by-case
application of the exception based on the totality of the circumstances,
holding that a categorical application of this exception is inappropriate.38
B. SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST EXCEPTION
The second relevant exception to the reasonableness requirement is the
search incident to arrest exception.39 Even before the adoption of the

28. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602,
616-17 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)).
29. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)).
30. Id. at 2173-74.
31. Id. at 2173 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).
32. Id.
33. Id. (discussing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 770-72; Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct.
1552, 1560-61 (2013)).
34. Id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 770-72).
35. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173-74 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770).
36. Id. at 2174 (citing McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1560-61).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 n.3).
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Fourth Amendment, this exception was recognized.40 The Supreme Court
finally addressed the exception in dicta and confirmed the right “to search
the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidence of crime.”41 In subsequent years, the Court attempted to
delineate the contours of this exception until it provided some clarity in
Chimel v. California.42 Chimel provided a general rule allowing arresting
officers to search both “the person arrested” and “the area ‘within his
immediate control.’”43 The purpose of this type of search is two-fold: first,
it promotes the safety of the officer by preventing the arrestee from
accessing a weapon, and second, it prevents the destruction of evidence.44
This exception was further clarified by the Court in United States v.
Robinson, authorizing a categorical application of the exception to all
lawful custodial arrests.45 Recently in Riley v. California, the Court
reaffirmed the categorical application of the rule and considered its use in
situations that were not envisioned when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.46 Further, the Court provided an analytical framework to address
these new situations: a court must analyze “the degree to which [breath and
blood tests] intrud[e] upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to
which [breath and blood tests are] needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”47 The Birchfield Court proceeded to analyze the
reasonableness of warrantless breath and blood tests under this standard
because the technology used to conduct such tests was not envisioned when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.48
III. ANALYSIS
In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court, with Justice Alito
writing for the majority,49 ruled the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement for warrantless searches was satisfied in warrantless breath
tests incident to drunk driving arrests, but not in warrantless blood tests

40.
41.
(1914)).
42.
43.
44.
45.
(1973)).
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 2174-75.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2175 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
Id. at 2175.
Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754 (1969)).
Id.; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2175-76 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
Id. at 2176.
Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 2166.
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incident to the same.50 The Court employed the Riley test to balance
individual privacy concerns with the degree to which the government needs
warrantless searches to promote its legitimate interests.51 The Court noted
breath tests were minimally invasive, unlikely to cause great
embarrassment, and give limited information; therefore, the privacy
concerns did not outweigh the need to preserve public highway safety.52
The Court, however, noted blood tests were significantly more intrusive and
allowed for a plethora of information beyond a mere BAC calculation to be
gleaned from the blood sample.53 In light of a less intrusive, alternative
way of measuring BAC, the privacy concerns were greater than the need to
preserve public highway safety; thus, warrantless blood tests were found
unconstitutional.54 Accordingly, states cannot criminalize refusal to submit
to an unconstitutional warrantless search.55
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are prohibited
except in cases where an exception applies.56 The Court followed prior
case law and did not categorically apply the exigent circumstances
exception.57 Rather, the Birchfield majority analyzed the constitutionality
of warrantless breath and blood tests separately under the search incident to
arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.58
1. Constitutionality of Warrantless Breath Tests
The Court began by analyzing the impact of a warrantless breath test
on individual privacy interests.59 Prior Supreme Court caselaw has
determined breath tests do not “implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.”60
Moreover, the Court pointed to three reasons this determination remains
accurate.61

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
(2013)).
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 2185.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176.
Id. at 2176-78.
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 2184.
Id. at 2186.
Id. at 2173.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (citing McNeely v. Missouri, 133 S. Ct. 1521, 1556
Id. at 2176.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2176-77.
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First, the Court described the physical intrusion of a breath test as
“almost negligible.”62 The process of a breath test entails no more effort
than it would take to blow up a party balloon.63 More specifically, the
process requires one to blow continuously for four to fifteen seconds into a
mouthpiece similar to a straw connected to the testing machine.64 The
Court likened this process to the common usage of straws in today’s
society.65 Additionally, the Court did not entertain an argument concerning
a possessory interest or emotional attachment to air exhalation from the
body.66 Finally, the Court looked to prior decisions and determined a
breath test was no more intrusive than the “negligible” intrusion of a buccal
swab to collect DNA or the “very limited intrusion” of scraping under a
suspect’s fingernails to obtain evidence.67 Accordingly, the procedure is
not excessively intrusive.68
Second, the breath test allows authorities to get one, and only one,
piece of information, the arrestee’s BAC level.69 Once the level is read,
authorities no longer possess anything that may be used to get further
information about the arrestee.70 The Court noted that this contrasts from
the DNA swabs mentioned before, because the DNA obtained via a buccal
swab had the potential to give the authorities a plethora of “highly personal
information” far beyond a mere calculation of the level of alcohol on one’s
breath.71
Finally, submitting to a breath test is not likely to exacerbate
embarrassment beyond what is inherent in any arrest.72 The Court noted the
test in itself is not inherently embarrassing.73 Additionally, the Court
recognized the tests are usually conducted outside the public view.74
Although there is not an increased amount of embarrassment, the Court
concluded by mentioning when a person is under arrest, the expectation of
privacy is diminished.75 Accordingly, the Court echoed prior caselaw and
62. Id. at 2176.
63. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177.
64. Id. at 2176.
65. Id. at 2177.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291, 296 (1973)).
68. Id.
69. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177.
70. Id.
71. Id. (discussing King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177.
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agreed that breath testing still does not “implicat[e] significant privacy
concerns.”76
Next, the Court analyzed the degree to which the government needs the
BAC reading of individuals arrested for drunk driving to promote legitimate
government interests.77 Two reasons were discussed regarding the
government’s interest in obtaining the BAC reading.78 The Court discussed
the importance of public highway safety and the need to deter individuals
from driving under the influence.79
First, the Court recognized the government’s continued “paramount
interest . . . in preserving the safety . . . of public highways.”80
Additionally, alcohol consumption is the leading cause of traffic fatalities
and injuries.81 Thus, the Court reasoned the government has an interest in
obtaining BAC levels in an effort to combat the “carnage” and “slaughter”
caused by drunk drivers.82 Second, the Court discussed the government’s
interest in creating a deterrent effect on drivers to combat the threat of
drunk driving before it ever happens.83
Today, the Court’s determination that breath tests do not implicate
significant privacy concerns has not strayed.84 Moreover, the government
continues to have a paramount interest in implementing legal consequences
for drunk driving to protect public roadways.85 Therefore, because the
government’s need for BAC testing outweighs the slight impact of breath
tests on privacy, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests
incident to lawful drunk driving arrests.86
2. Constitutionality of Warrantless Blood Tests
The Court used the same framework to analyze the constitutionality of
warrantless blood tests.87 Accordingly, the Court began by clearly
differentiating blood tests from breath tests for two reasons.88 First, a blood
test involves extracting a part of an arrestee’s body through piercing his or

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 2178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2178-79.
Id. (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178.
Id.
Id. at 2179.
Id.
Id. at 2178.
Id. at 2184.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178.
Id.
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her skin; therefore, it is significantly more intrusive than blowing into a
tube.89 Second, a blood sample extraction would allow authorities to access
a wealth of information beyond a mere BAC calculation.90 In addition, the
Court even noted that if authorities limited the use of the blood sample to
just BAC calculation, the extraction alone may result in increased anxiety
of potential information being disclosed.91 For these reasons, there are
more privacy concerns in blood testing than breath testing.92
The Court pointed to the same asserted need to obtain BAC readings as
in the above breath test constitutionality discussion.93 The Court noted
there was no additional reasoning asserted for the significantly more
intrusive blood testing to ascertain BAC readings.94 Thus, in light of a less
intrusive, alternative method, the Court determined the privacy concerns
were sufficient to render warrantless blood tests unreasonable, and therefore
unconstitutional.95
3. Majority Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court determined warrantless breath tests, but not
blood tests, incident to drunk driving arrests are reasonable.96 This
determination affects the states’ ability to criminalize refusal to comply
with such testing.97 The Court borrows from Fifth Amendment precedent
to determine motorists can only consent to reasonable conditions.98 Thus,
because warrantless blood tests are found unreasonable, motorists cannot be
presumed to have consented to a blood test and criminalized for refusal of
the same.99
The following paragraph explains the application of the Court’s legal
conclusions to the facts at hand. Law enforcement officers threatened the
first petitioner, Birchfield, with an unlawful search.100 Based on that
search, Birchfield was unlawfully convicted for refusing to submit to the
blood test; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded to the North Dakota

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178-79.
94. Id. at 2184.
95. Id. at 2185.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2185-86.
98. Id. at 2186.
99. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186
100. Id.
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Supreme Court.101 The second petitioner, Bernard, had no right to refuse
the warrantless breath test because the test is permissible incident to a drunk
driving arrest; therefore, the Court affirmed the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision.102 Finally, the third petitioner, Beylund, submitted to a blood test
after police told him that the law required his submission.103 The North
Dakota Supreme Court based its conclusion of Beylund’s voluntary consent
on the incorrect assumption that the state could compel blood tests;
therefore, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision and
remanded to the North Dakota Supreme Court.104
B. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justices Sotomayor105 and Thomas106 wrote partial dissents in
Birchfield. Both dissents rested on the appropriate application, categorical
or case-by-case, of the relevant exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement.107 Justice Sotomayor advocated for a case-by-case
approach, requiring a warrant in all cases except when exigent
circumstances provide an exception to the requirement.108 Alternatively,
Justice Thomas advocated for a categorical application of the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for all BAC tests, blood
and breath tests alike.109
1. Justice Sotomayor’s Partial Dissent
In the first Birchfield partial dissent, Justice Sotomayor, in which
Justice Ginsburg joined, disagreed with the majority’s categorical
exemption of breath tests from the warrant requirement under the search
incident to arrest doctrine, calling its application a “considerable
overgeneralization.”110 Rather, she argued that the search incident to arrest
exception should be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine
reasonableness.111 She reasoned that law enforcement officers are not
authorized to conduct unreasonable searches based solely on the arrest of a

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2186-87.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187.
Id. at 2196.
Id. at 2187-98.
Id. at 2188-89.
Id. at 2197-98.
Id. at 2191, 2195 & n. 3.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2195.
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suspect.112 Therefore, Justice Sotomayor advocated that all blood and
breath tests incident to drunk driving arrests be subjected to the warrant
requirement.
She supported her argument by pointing to the timeline of
administration of breath tests and law enforcement’s common practice
allowing plenty of time to obtain a warrant.113 More specifically, breath
tests are usually conducted after the driver is arrested and taken to a police
station, observed for fifteen to twenty minutes, given a certain amount of
time to contact his or her attorney, and, in some cases, up to thirty minutes
to prepare the testing machine.114 In total, Minnesota and North Dakota
allow the police a two-hour period of time from the traffic stop until the
administration of the breath test, which is sufficient to obtain a search
warrant.115
In addition to the time available to secure a warrant, Justice Sotomayor
shed light on the “advances in technology that now permit ‘the more
expeditious processing of warrant applications.’”116 She also stressed that
the warrant requirement would apply only to those arrestees who refuse
breath tests.117 Moreover, this burden would not be excessive on
government officials, estimating the increased burden on the magistrates in
North Dakota and Minnesota would be no more than one warrant per
week.118 Justice Sotomayor made clear there are other judicial tools
available to force compliance even with a warrant requirement, such as
imposing criminal punishment due to obstructing justice by not adhering to
a lawfully obtained search warrant.119
Overall, when applying the search incident to arrest doctrine to blood
and breath tests, Justice Sotomayor contends the best way to evaluate which
exception is proper to apply is to “ask whether the exception best addresses
the nature of the postarrest search and the needs it fulfills.”120 The purpose
of the search incident to arrest exception is to preserve evidence that may be
destroyed before procuring a warrant.121 Given the usual timeline allotted
between the stop and the breath test, the purpose of the exception is usually

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 2195-96.
Id. at 2192.
Id.
Id. at 2192-93.
Id. at 2192 (quoting McNeely v. Missouri, 133 S. Ct. 1521, 1562 (2013)).
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2193.
Id. at 2193-94.
Id. at 2194.
Id. at 2196.
Id.
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not fulfilled in the case of breath tests.122 Thus, it is inappropriate to
categorically apply this exception to all breath tests because it does not
comport with the exception’s purpose.123 In conclusion, Justice Sotomayor
expressed her concern that if the Court continues down the current path, the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment will be a mere suggestion
rather than a constitutional requirement.124
2. Justice Thomas’ Partial Dissent
In the second Birchfield partial dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed with
the majority’s nitpicking regarding where to draw a distinction between
blood and breath tests.125 He referred to the distinction as “an arbitrary line
in the sand” and argued what should have been resolved was whether “the
search-incident-to-arrest exception permits bodily searches to prevent the
destruction of BAC evidence.”126 Justice Thomas finds little support in the
Court’s precedent for the compromise of allowing warrantless breath tests
but not warrantless blood tests.127
Justice Thomas finds the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement more appropriate in this situation.128 He contends, as
he also proposed in McNeely, that “the natural metabolization of [BAC]
creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is
drunk” and it follows that both warrantless blood and breath tests are
constitutional.129 Justice Thomas continues by expressing concern that the
Birchfield majority drew a distinction between types of BAC evidence
when analyzing the search incident to arrest exception, but did not allow
such a distinction in McNeely when the Court found inappropriate a
categorical application of the exigency exception for all BAC
calculations.130
In conclusion, Justice Thomas suggested the McNeely Court was wrong
in its determination that the natural dissipation over time of BAC evidence
could not categorically create an exigency in every drunk driving case.131
Thus, in this case, he argues both warrantless blood and breath tests should
122. Id.
123. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2197.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 2198.
129. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2198; see McNeely v. Missouri, 133 S. Ct. 1521, 1576 (2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2198.
131. See generally id.
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be constitutional via the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.132
IV. IMPACT
In 2013, North Dakota passed legislation making an initial refusal to
take a BAC test a misdemeanor offense punishable in the same manner as
driving under the influence.133 Such penalties apply to refusals of blood,
breath, and urine testing.134 Penalties include mandatory addiction
treatment and sentences ranging from a mandatory fine of $500 to
imprisonment of at least one year and one day.135
The clear application of this case to North Dakota law will be a change
in the current law and an effect on pending and future cases that present
these issues. Prosecutors will be required to advise law enforcement
officers on new law-abiding procedures that deviate from what the statute
currently dictates and law enforcement’s previous practices.
This
advisement will ensure the state is successful in deterring drunk driving
through the prosecution of these offenses and in enhancing public policy
regarding safety on the roads, ultimately preventing the loss of innocent
lives due to drunk driving.
Moving forward, the North Dakota legislature needs to consider the
pros and cons of blood testing. If the legislature determines blood testing is
the best option for obtaining evidence in drunk driving prosecutions, it will
likely need to develop a system that allows for prompt and effective
issuance of search warrants for arrestees who refuse to submit to blood
testing. Alternatively, if the legislature determines breath testing is an
adequate way to calculate BAC for drunk driving prosecutions, it can likely
continue to inform drivers that their refusal to submit to a breath test is a
crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence.
Either way, the Birchfield Court paved the way for the commencement of
the legislative process in North Dakota. The state is now tasked with
implementing creative and effective solutions to the ongoing issue of
drunk driving while remaining within the bounds of the Constitution.
Birchfield provides a platform for the North Dakota legislature to step in
and take over. The legislature must balance North Dakota’s interest in

132. Id.
133. Id. at 2170; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01, 39-08-01 (2016).
134. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170; see also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39–08–01(2), 39–20–01,
39–20–14 (2016).
135. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170.
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protecting its public roads with the privacy interests of North Dakota
citizens to create an effective strategy for all.
V. CONCLUSION
In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court held warrantless breath
tests, but not blood tests, incident to lawful drunk driving arrests are
constitutional under the search incident to arrest doctrine.136 The Court
reasoned because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests
and provide law enforcement with information necessary to serve their
interests in promoting public road safety,137 warrantless breath tests are
reasonable, and, therefore, constitutional.138 Because the Court found
warrantless blood tests unconstitutional, it subsequently determined states
cannot criminalize an arrestee’s refusal to comply with the same.139 This
determination directly impacts North Dakota’s criminal refusal statute, and
in turn, may affect the impact of drunk driving in North Dakota. In
response to this decision, the North Dakota legislature is tasked with
determining how to proceed to effectuate new strategies that both protect
the public roadways and comport with the Fourth Amendment.
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